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 Opening address 
 
Kaoru Ugawa 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your kind introduction. My name is Ugawa. 
 
I would like to say a few words of greeting on behalf of the Tokyo Study Group in Comparative Urban 
History. I'm very pleased to have the opportunity to attend the lecture and seminar of Prof. Peter Clark who 
comes to Japan to be with you today at the invitation of the Japan society for the promotion of science. I 
would like to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Yoneyama, Tokyo Metropolitan University, and Prof. 
Yasumoto, Komazawa University, and Prof. Nakano Waseda University for their preparation of this 
seminar. Our Study Group has now been in existence for more than forty four years, and, though on a 
small-scale, I think that our field of specialisation corresponds to that of Professor Clark. 
On a personal level, I had started research of the British agrarian history, about 50 years ago, 
when I decided to begin a new subject of research in the field of Comparative Urban History.  I consulted 
with Professor Hisao Otsuka who had been my supervisor. He said 'I always wondered who was going to 
be the first scholar in the field of Comparative Urban History, and now I find it is you.' He gave me an 
encouraging smile. Which I remember as if it were yesterday. 
Today I return to my first resolution, and listen to Professor Clark's lecture with you, the 
researchers who have gathered here in the same spirit. I hope you will allow me to be a member of this 
seminar. Thank you very much. 
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Cities in East and West 
 
Peter Clark 
 
Thanks to the Japanese Society for funding my fellowship in Japan and making possible this lecture and 
seminar. 
 
Lecture today draws on two of my works. My European Cities and Towns (Oxford, 2009) and The Oxford 
Handbook of Cities in World History (Oxford, 2013) 
 
In 2007, for the first time, the majority of the world’s inhabitants lived in cities rather than the countryside. 
The world has become, in some measure, truly urban. No less striking was the proliferation of large cities. 
Currently there are over 400 cities with over a million inhabitants and more than 100 exceeding 3 million, 
compared to only one city ( Edo, modern Tokyo) with over a million people in the 18th century. How has 
this critical transition come about? How did global city systems evolve and interact in the past? What was 
the role of cities within societies and how did this compare between regions?  Between cities of the East 
and West? 
It is the fundamental contention of my work that the comparative study of the world’s 
urban communities in the past is a precondition for understanding contemporary and future urban 
development on a global basis.  In this lecture I want to talk first about the literature on comparative urban 
history; then secondly at the broad trends in global urban development; and finally focus on institutional 
differences and similarities between cities in the East and West. 
 Although the last few years has seen renewed and growing work on comparative urban 
history, already  50 or 60 years ago there was lively interest in comparative research. One early influence 
came from Robert Park and the Chicago School which tried to construct a general model of the city, 
though most of their detailed analysis was modelled on American cities.  This had a major impact in the 
US and Britain after the 2nd World War. Another impetus came from the French Annales School which 
again after the Second World War under the influence of Braudel compared developments across Europe 
and the Mediterranean . 
For the comparison of cities in East and West, perhaps the most important work was Max 
Weber’s The City, first published in German 1921 but becoming widely known after its translation into 
English in 1958.  A leading German sociologist Weber’s study argued strongly for the distinctive civic and 
communal identity of the European city rooted in its medieval Christian heritage with important levels of 
urban autonomy and community consciousness, with strong municipal institutions,  which made them 
centres of innovation. In contrast he saw the cities of the Middle East and Asia,  as endowed with no 
municipal institutions and an undeveloped sense of identity and overshadowed and stultified by  powerful 
despotic states. 
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 Weber’s argument provoked fierce debate and has been largely discredited, though it gave 
important momentum to comparative work on Islamic cities and Chinese cities and continues to be 
discussed. 
 One major criticism is that much of his analysis of the European city is centred around the 
flourishing German imperial cities and North Italian city states of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance. 
These cities did enjoy considerable autonomy and success at that time. But in many other parts of Europe 
cities often exercised only limited autonomy or none at all. In England for instance only just over 100 
towns out of 700 or so had a borough charter and municipal autonomy of some kind. In Northern Europe 
an equally limited number of towns enjoyed a measure of autonomy. In England and Northern and Eastern 
Europe many towns were heavily dependent on the king or local landowners.  A second major criticism of 
weber is that from the 16th century the rise of nation states in Europe increasingly eroded much of the 
independence of cities.  Even in Germany and Northern Italy municipal institutions were often undermined.   
Thirdly, work on Asian cities has shown that even where there were no formal urban institutions informal 
power groups or elites and informal institutions such as associations could play an important role in urban 
political and social life. 
A fourth major criticism of Weber is that he assumes that the Western cities generally 
perform better, are more dynamic, than their Eastern counterparts. But as we will see, the global 
urbanisation process in the past was far from being consistent, predictable or sustained. It was 
characterised by a roller coaster of developments with waves of expansion followed by deceleration, even 
de-urbanisation. At certain times expansion (and sometimes contraction) was a general, near-global 
process- as in the great era of city growth from Asia to Europe during the 11th to 14th centuries. But not at 
other times, as in the 17th and 19th centuries when first Europe, and then later China and India stood outside 
the main urbanisation trends.  
 
Let us look now at the broad urbanisation trends across the world. But first a word of 
background. Cities appear to have originated in Mesopotamia around 3200 BC and then spread to the Nile 
river valley and thence across the Mediterannean world. Cities also emerge on an important scale in the 
Indus valley (2600 BC-1900 BC) and in China by 1400 BC.  
By the first century AD  developed urban systems are found in a number of regions of the 
world : across the Mediterranean and into the Middle East, largely under Roman rule; but also extending 
its tentacles across the Sahara into northern Africa ; in northern and western India; and in China under the 
Han. There are also early Mayan developments in central America.   
However for an extended period from the 3rd century AD there was growing instability in 
the existing urban systems and no indication of any new urban developments. The Greco-Roman network 
divided into the Eastern and Western Empires and then suffered major decline especially in the West.  In 
the Middle East Arab Muslim conquests led to short term upheaval with ancient cities attacked but new 
ones established.  Chinese cities during the age of the Six Dynasties suffered from instability and warfare.      
Political instability- tribal invasions into urban Europe; Muslim invasions of the Byzantine empire;  
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political upheavals in India and China - had an impact.  But so did the spread of pandemics, especially 
bubonic plague from the 3rdnd century, decimating populations, disrupting  agriculture, disturbing long-
distance  trade . All this contributed to urban stagnation or instability. 
From the 9th century however the world seems to have enjoyed an extended period of urban 
expansion stretching from Europe to the Middle East and Asia.  It was remarkable not only for apparently 
high urban rates but for the proliferation of mega cities in the Middle East and China- Baghdad with up to 
a million inhabitants in the 12th century, Cairo with perhaps half a million, Kaifeng with up to 1.4 m in the 
12th century, Hangschou with around a million in the 13th- in comparison no European city probably had 
more than 250,000 people.  A massive increase took place in the number of towns, with urban centres, 
often market towns,  founded or growing up in new regions- for instance in Northern and central/Eastern 
Europe; in Japan; China; in southern India;  in east Africa; and central- south America. There was an 
opening up of urban economies with the proliferation of luxury crafts and the major expansion of long-
distance trade, both within global areas and across continents- thus the development of overland and 
maritime routes between China, India, the Middle and Europe. There was also probably a heightened sense 
of urban political importance, although levels of civic autonomy and institutions varied greatly between 
different areas of the world. More evidently there are signs of an enhanced cultural role for cities in many 
regions- manifested in architecture, religious and educational significance, and in representations.  Why 
such developments? Helping to promote  this second major wave of global urbanisation was the 
widespread  growth of population, helped by a diminution of epidemics; increased agricultural output; 
greater political stability- most notably the creation of the Mongol empire from Europe to East Asia; and 
linked to this and other developments, the revival and efflorescence of inter-continental trade. 
During the 14th and 15th centuries urban growth lost momentum again and in some areas of 
the world may have gone into reverse. This was arguably the case more in Europe and the Middle East, 
less so in China and Japan, or in Latin America. Nonetheless there are indications of demographic decline 
for some of the world’s leading cities; and of a stabilisation in the number of towns. There is little evidence 
for a significant expansion in the aggregate number of new urban centres.  Economically, the disruption of 
intercontinental trade between Asia, the Middle East and Europe may have led to the reduced importance 
of urban industries, though urban services seem to have expanded.  Influential was the return of plague 
pandemics from the early 14th century, spreading from China via central Asia to the Middle East and 
Europe, having a disruptive impact on urban populations, agriculture, and long distance trade. Also 
significant was the break-up of the Mongol Empire and other forms of political instability in Europe, the 
Middle East, and India: also in Japan from the late 15th century caused by civil war. 
The urban roller-coaster lurched forward again in the 16th to 18th centuries. The resurgence 
of urban growth was particularly sustained in China under the later Ming and Ch’ing; in India under the 
Mughal Empire from the 1520s; in Japan after the end of the 16th century civil wars; in Europe it only 
lasted into the early 17th century.  A notable rise of very large cities occurred in Asia (Edo, Beijing), the 
Middle East (Istanbul), and Europe (London). There were many new towns established: in China, Japan, 
but also in Europe and Latin America (where new networks of colonial towns were created), with smaller 
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numbers in North America and Africa.  There was also the development of a necklace of inter-connected 
international port cities from Havana to Manila, Guangzhou, Batavia, Calcutta, Madras, Bombay, Lisbon,  
Amsterdam, London and Hamburg . 
 During this period urban growth was propelled by renewed demographic expansion- 
despite the continuing high incidence of epidemics in major cities; thereby underlining the crucial 
importance the large scale of immigration from the countryside. Another factor was agricultural 
improvement and the increasing sophistication of agricultural trade, while the development of global 
maritime trade between the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and Europe, pivoting on SE Asia,  provided 
impetus for industrial production and urban consumption. No less important was the new consolidation of 
state power in Asia, the Middle East (under the Ottomans), and in Europe (with the rise of more effective, 
often centralised states), and the extension of European rule to the Americas. Cities became the privileged 
hubs of expanded state power.  
Thus up to the 18th century contrary to Weber’s ideas Eastern cities seem to have been 
doing much better than Western cities.  However, the late 18th century and early 19th century was a time of  
urban transition. Some writers have spoken of the Great Divergence. In the preceding period Asian cities 
had been among the biggest, most advanced, and most dynamic in the world, but by the early 19th century 
West European cities were increasingly innovative and expansive. Indicative of this, urbanisation began to 
accelerate in Europe, led by Britain and Belgium, whilst Chinese, Japanese and Indian rates probably 
stagnated.  At the same European capital cities like London, Paris and Brussels grew strongly and there 
was the first upsurge of specialist towns, including new industrial centres, and the first leisure towns. In 
economic terms however European cities retained many traditional features and this was also true of their 
political governance: in consequence they were slow to adapt to the mounting social pressures of 
urbanisation. In 1850 the vast majority of human kind still lived outside cities and towns and, even those 
who were town dwellers, for the great part inhabited communities that were essentially pre-modern and 
traditional in their socio- economic, political structures and cultural and built environments. 
The era from the late 19th century to the Second World War marked the onset of the third 
great age of urbanisation. In Europe the countries of Western Europe forged ahead both in the level of 
urban growth and the creation of new models of urban society and governance which were to have a 
powerful influence across the world. At the same time, within Europe less urbanised regions began to 
catch up, while across the Atlantic American cities began to multiply in number, leapfrogging from the 
East Coast to the Midwest to the West Coast, just as the number of great cities expanded, and as in Europe 
an upsurge occurred of specialist industrial and other towns. Meantime, the network of international port 
cities was reinforced and consolidated by the rise of global trade and steamships. Outside Europe and 
North America these global port cities were often the most dynamic urban centres. By comparison the 
traditional urban systems in Latin America, the Middle East, India and China were sluggish and slow to 
expand. The big exception in Asia was Japan, where after the Meiji Restoration there was an accelerating 
pace of urban and industrial development, with rising urbanisation rates matched by the revival of the 
country’s biggest cities. 
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It was not just that a growing majority of the population of Europe and the United States 
lived in cities by 1939, but that those cities were powerful showcases for Western urbanity on a global 
scale. The growth of Western cities as industrial and service centres; the expansion of municipal provision 
and infrastructure, often with the support of central government; the efflorescence of cities as cultural 
centres; the increased planning of cities: all had an important influence on urban development outside the 
advanced West. 
 As we know the late 20th century was equally a time of dramatic change. Firstly, as we 
have noted, the period after the Second World War  saw increasing urban convergence as urban growth 
rates rose sharply in Japan, China, India, the Middle East and  Latin America, though Africa trailed behind; 
by comparison European and North American urbanisation rates broadly stagnated  from the 1970s. 
Secondly, a high proportion of the new urban growth in the expanding countries was concentrated in mega 
cities from Tokyo to Cairo and Mexico City; by comparison there were relatively few new towns. Thirdly 
the earlier specialist cities- industrial towns and global port cities have suffered serious set backs, not only 
in Europe and North America but where they were established in Asia too. Lastly there has been a major 
expansion of urban services on the Western model, though with a significant shortfall in provision in many 
developing countries; even in North America and parts of Europe the large-scale expansion of the post-war 
decades was reversed from the 1970s and 1980s.  
 Influential factors behind these developments include relative declines in technology 
leadership and labour productivity in Western cities; major population growth in Asia, the Middle East and 
Latin America, leading to large-scale movement from the countryside; major advances in global trade, but 
now restructured and more evenly balanced towards non-Western countries; the growing problem of 
government-city relations in many parts of Europe and North America. 
 This picture is highly schematic. But without understanding urban global trends over time   
it is impossible to understand the development of the city not only  in the past – but in the future. A global 
comparative approach seems to me to raise three fundamental questions about urban development Firstly, 
how far are developments autarkic- ie shaped by special local factors (for instance the geophysical,  
political etc).  Secondly how far are developments which may show parallels between regions- influenced 
by the shared structural pressures of urbanisation- eg the impact of heavy migration? Thirdly how far is 
convergence the result of connectivity- interactions between urban systems through trade, epidemics,  
political or cultural links. 
                    Here in the final part of this lecture I want to shed light on these questions by looking in more 
detail at one of the key components of Max Weber’s model comparing the Western and Oriental city: 
According to Weber, one of the major dividing markers was the importance in Western cities of municipal 
institutions (including   courts), along with a measure of urban autonomy. In the Handbook Jan Luiten van 
Zander e his co-authors in the chapter on the Premodern Economy argue that civic autonomy was an 
important reason for the long-term economic success of Western cities compared to their non-Western 
counterparts. But I want to ask a somewhat different question. How significant were municipal institutions 
for cities in the early modern period? To start with it is worth remembering that only a small proportion of 
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European cities (15% perhaps) had municipal privileges of any significance. Nor was urban autonomy 
unknown outside Europe and its colonies. Thus Kyoto and Sakai in 16th century Japan enjoyed some form 
of civic government. One Portugese visitor at that time declared that “Sakai is governed by the consuls like 
Venice”. In the Middle East too civic elites sometimes seized power at time of political instability. But this 
was the exception and Weber’s dictum about municipal institutions in the West but not in the East 
generally holds true. But does it matter?  What happens on the ground in cities? Let us try and answer this 
question by looking at the crucial issue of conflict resolution, here I mean local disputes, fights etc.. 
 In Oriental cities as Weber notes justice was officially administered by imperial officials. 
In China, as in Europe, there seems to have been an institutionalisation of justice. However there is 
considerable evidence that much conflict management was actually handled by a wide variety of non-
official bodies, possibly in association with the courts.  Guilds seem to have been especially important.  In 
Japan urban brotherhoods dealt with disputes between members and from the 17th century so-called stock 
societies policed themselves. In Qing China important arbitration was undertaken by controlling boards of 
guilds which often overlapped with native place societies. Native place societies- of migrants from the 
same area- also played a key role in settling disputes and conflicts, with formal signed agreements which 
could be shown in court if necessary.  In the Middle East urban guilds multiplied under the Ottoman 
Empire with apparently a major concern to end conflict.  Under Islam mediation and arbitration outside 
courts was widely recognized from early on. Neighbourhood organizations had similar mediating functions 
in Japan and Thailand as well as in Middle Eastern cities. Public drinking houses were other key sites for 
mediating conflict- thus Ottoman coffeehouses- 600 in late 16th century Istanbul. In Qing Chinese cities 
teahouses served as the focus of many clubs and societies and hosted rituals of dispute resolution with 
dozens of participants on either side, witnesses being called and adjudication sometimes by the proprietor. 
So how different was the picture in municipal Europe?  Probably not so different. There is 
evidence to suggest that even when courts were involved in disputes magistrates used official sanctions 
only when all else failed. In the German imperial city of Freiburg – an archetypal Weberian municipality- 
John Jordan has argued that “mediation rather than a desire to punish violence appears to have been a key 
objective” of the city magistrates.  Here as in English towns suretors- “burgen”- often neighbours- played a 
key role guaranteeing that parties in brawls and fights would follow through on the terms of their dispute 
settlement.  Jordan argues that a major part of the responsibility to maintain peace within the city was 
transferred from the formal institutional realm to the informal one of personal, neighbourly and 
professional relationships. 
In Spain a law suit might be simply a way of confirming previous arbitration or as a formal 
prelude to it.  At Burgos at the end of the Middle Ages three quarters of the lawsuits involving Spanish 
merchants were ultimately resolved by the use of arbiters. In Sweden though town courts increasingly 
carried out royal justice, in many cities arbitration and mediation outside the courts remained the norm. In 
England as Bob Shoemaker and others have shown arbitration was widespread for resolving a great variety 
of  lesser urban conflicts and disputes. City leaders wherever possible sought to prevent inhabitants taking 
their disputes to court. At Leicester in 1575 the town ordered “that none of the inhabitants…shall sue one 
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another for any cause or matter” in the courts, but the aggrieved party should complain to the mayor or 
local alderman who was to send for the parties and “ then if they can to take order with them and agree 
with them without suit of law”; only if that fails to be allowed to sue in the town court.  
As in the East, arbitration across Europe was in the hands of neighbours and local worthies. 
In the Low Countries city neighbourhood boards (200 in Ghent) arbitrated disputes. Guilds were also 
important in European towns (as outside Europe) for settling disputes, in particular trying to keep conflicts 
between brethren within the guild. In London guilds had regulations banning members going to court with 
each other and requiring them to submit disputes to arbitration by guild officials. From the Middle Ages 
merchant guilds across Europe were heavily engaged in arbitration as merchants sought to avoid legal 
proceedings in the interests of preserving their reputation even when it meant writing down or off 
commercial debts. 
From the 17th century new channels of mediation were appearing.  Georgian Britain may 
have had around 20,000 clubs and societies. London had most, with perhaps 3000 societies and 90 
different types.  Many clubs had rules to resolve disputes between members and a great deal of club 
business time was spent trying to control the conduct of members.  One specialist type of association 
which proliferated in major port cities from the 1760s, the chamber of commerce had special procedures 
for arbitrating disputes between its mobile members, rather like the old merchant guilds. But this was not 
unique. The most successful 18th century association, the freemasons, established in London in 1717 with 
around 500 clubs in England by 1800, had as its one of its main principles the resolution of disputes 
between members. It was also famous for its help to migrant members. So it is possible that we are starting 
to see the extension of mediation on a more general scale, beyond the traditional role of conciliating 
co/residents or neighbours or members of the same trade to include respectable migrants, gentlemen,  
artisans and traders on the move, increasingly important in a commercializing society.  But this is not to 
overstate the novelty of this new development. Given that virtually all British clubs assembled in drinking 
houses one can see the continuity with older traditions of local arbitration. In contrast to Britain, 
associational activity was somewhat more limited on the European continent, with significant differences 
(thus meeting in public houses was less common). Still it is possible too that German and French societies, 
particularly the many masonic lodges, played a similar significant role in arbitration processes for 
members. 
So from this brief over-view it would seem that arbitration was widespread with often similar 
forms of dispute resolution in many European, Middle Eastern and East Asian cities. There is something 
similar to be said in regard to other areas of urban governance- for instance social welfare or urban 
improvement, but there is no space to discuss those topics here. Rather I want to concentrate on why the 
widespread use of arbitration in many contexts?  A possible shortlist of reasons might include the 
following, though I am sure you will have further ideas. 
1. the poor reputation of litigation in the courts. For the aggrieved, the lawsuit was seen as taking a 
long time. It was expensive. With litigants and their lawyers doing their best to defame the credibility of 
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the other parties it could have a long-term effect on a townsman’s reputation. This in turn could damage 
his economic prospects when continuing business success or survival depended so much on trust. 
2. If litigation had a bad image, the status of lawyers was infinitely worse.  
All lawyers were tainted by popular allegations of voraciousness, of exploiting litigation for their 
own financial purposes.  Rightly or wrongly, many of the problems of litigation were blamed on them. 
Their reputation in England and Europe was notorious: in the Low Countries they had a name from time 
immemorial as money-grubbers .In the early 17th century Jesuits held special services at Ghent to convert 
lawyers to moral paths- doubtless in vain. In China they were called “litigation tricksters” (songgun), 
“rascally fellows [who] entrap people for the sake of profit”. 
 3. Elite dislike of litigation because it undermined harmony and good order. In China 
Confucianism explicitly commended arbitration as a way of maintaining social harmony. In Europe as we 
noted town leaders viewed litigation as a bad option, partly because of concern that respectable tradesmen 
would be ruined by the high cost of litigation, so reducing their ability to contribute to the urban 
community, both economically and through civic office-holding. No less important however  was a 
concern that with the inevitable mudslinging associated with litigation, that  conventional, idealized trope 
of civic harmony and order, constantly reiterated in civic regulations, would be undermined, with other 
townspeople being dragged into the legal melee as witnesses etc.  
4.  This was linked to the pressures that urbanization created for the social order of the community. 
Unresolved conflicts might seriously aggravate and feed on what we noted earlier were the often fractious 
social, religious and other relations in cities. It was not just civic paranoia. There is considerable evidence 
from a number of English towns that lawsuits between townsmen could precipitate long-term divisions and 
conflict that enveloped the community and called into question its civic government. 
5. on the supply side, the availability of a plurality of mediators embedded in the city, including 
town worthies, and neighbours as well as neighbourly institutions and guilds  and clubs, reflecting the 
extraordinary organizational pluralism of early modern cities both in Europe and beyond. For such actors 
mediation served to underline not only group solidarity and identity at the local level. It also helped 
prevent division and disintegration in what were essentially often fragile organizations or arrangements.  
Last but not least, it was a way of showing how they contributed to wider community harmony 
and cohesion and so justified their own agency. 
What can we understand in the context of the key questions I posed earlier affecting urban life- the 
role of local patterns, structural urban pressures and interconnectivity of cities? The precise forms of 
mediation undoubtedly exhibited local patterns shaped by local or regional factors- legal systems, 
political factors. Arguably there was also some interconnectivity of dispute arbitration at least among 
global merchants by the 18th century, and perhaps earlier.  But above all it appears that, despite 
institutional differences, cities across the world sought to cope with comparable structural challenges to 
social order and cohesion by frequently adopting or hosting broadly similar processes of arbitration and 
mediation to manage conflict. To answer my earlier question about do municipalities matter? In this 
context it seems only to a limited extent. 
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So let me conclude by making three basic points. Firstly comparative urban history, the 
comparison of cities in the West and East, is important not only to understand global urban trends but also 
to understand how cities in our own countries or regions of the world work.  Secondly, that global urban 
history dates back to the origins of civilization and global urbanisation trends show both major periods of 
widespread urban growth across the world, as well as periods of  regional differentiation. Thirdly detailed 
comparisons of how cities function, eg in dealing with disputes   suggest we need a new approach to urban 
history. Historians understandably have been concerned up to now largely with looking at the impact of 
local and regional factors structuring and transforming urban society- at first level causation as it were. But 
there is considerable evidence as we have seen for the early modern period and not surprisingly  much 
more for the modern era that global cities experienced strikingly similar developments, in common 
response to structural problems of high levels of urbanisation: second-level causation. And finally we need 
always to bear in mind the growing impact on our big cities and ports of third level causation- international 
interactions, interconnectivity across different regions of the world. 
 
Thanks for your attention 
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 Introduction to the discussion 
 
Masaru Yoneyama 
 
My name is Masaru Yoneyama.  I am responsible for  organizing this seminar. ∗ 
 
First of all, I would like to express my thanks to Professor Clark who has accepted our invitation to Japan 
although he is at present very busy lecturing in Sweden and other countries)’ I also thank ‘Japan Society 
for the Promotion of Science’ for its financial support, as well as the many people who have cooperated to 
make this invitation possible) In addition, Last but not least, I would like to express my appreciation for 
the support provided by the ‘Tokyo Study Group in a Comparative Urban History’ in preparing this 
seminar and I  am grateful to our four discussants and Professor Yasumoto who is  chairing the seminar. 
 
Today’s theme, Comparison of Eastern and Western cities as considered with reference to Max Weber’s 
views is very interesting to us. It seems to be particularly attractive  for the historians working on the urban 
history in Japan. So we very much look forward to today’s lecture. However, as we already know, there 
are differing opinions on Max Weber’s views and according to the article for presented to this seminar they 
are we clearly understand the criticisms which seem to centre on the following four points. 
 1The First point is that Weber's analysis of the European cities was mainly based on the 
flourishing German imperial cities and North Italian city-states of the late Middle Ages and Renaissance. 
 2 the second is that from the 16th century onwards the rise of the nation-states in Europe 
increasingly eroded much of the independence of cities.  
These two criticisms concern Western history. 
 3 Thirdly, work on Asian cities has shown that even where there were no formal urban 
institutions, informal power groups or elites and informal institutions such as associations could have 
played an important role in urban political and social life. 
 4 A fourth major criticism of Weber’s view is that he assumed that the Western cities generally 
performed better, and were more dynamic, than their Eastern counterparts. 
 
Among these four criticisms, the last one could be called Euro-centrism. This is understandable even if we 
cannot always agree with it. In this lecture it has already been pointed out that we can see that many 
Eastern cities seem to have been doing better than their Western counterparts (on p.8 of the paper 
presented) if we look at pre-18th century towns 
∗ I am profoundly indebted to Prof.Clark and discussants for contributing generously. Needless to say, I take sole 
responsibility for any errors in editing this research paper and in translating the included articles .  
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By contrast the first two criticisms are more difficult for us to understand unless we are specialists, 
as they are mainly concerned with western history. So I have asked Prof .Ogura and Dr. Furukawa both 
specialists in German history to discuss these points. 
 
 Finally the third point about Asian cities is interesting but slightly complicated. Because, as 
mentioned in the lecture, the informal institution was important in Western cities too. However, for the 
time being, we would like to concentrate on Asian cities.  
Prof. Clark has recommended a list of further reading. In his list I have found an interesting article 
about this point, which is Friedricks ‘What made the Eurasian city work?’This list (was copied in the last 
page of seminar’s hand -out and also) appears after this introduction. On page 49 of this article, Friedricks 
has pointed out that 'some Japanese historians have argued that, during the early modern era, the smallest 
units of government in Japanese cities were in fact, entirely autonomous  neighbourhoods which had their 
own police forces, financial organizations and meeting halls 
This means that in some early modern Japanese towns, there were not only informal but also 
formal autonomous neighbourhoods and organizations. If this is the case, what was the difference between 
western towns and Japanese towns? I was wondering how was the actual the smallest units of governments, 
for example chous (町) and stock societies(株仲間) and relation between such units and feudal lords. 
I would like to ask our two discussants, Dr. Kato, who is a specialist on the governing institutions 
in Edo period, and Dr. Takatani, who is an expert on the implications of ‘autonomous’ in the Japanese 
urban history to discuss these points)   
These are reason why I ask these 4 Discussants. 
 
(I would like to summarize this in Japanese in a few minutes. ∗） 
 
 
A list of further reading 
Max Weber, The City (ed. D. Martindale and G. Neuwirth, NY 1962), 
Peter Clark, ed,,The Oxford Handbook of Cities (Oxford,2013),Chapter1:Introduction and chapter18:Japan, 
also chapter17:China. 
Peter Clark, European Cities and Towns 400-2000 (Oxford 2009), chapter 17. 
C. R. Friedrichs, “What Made the Eurasian City Work? Urban Political Cultures in Early Modern Europe 
and Asia”, in City Limits: Perspectives on the Historical European City, edited by G. Clark, Owens, J., 
and Smith, G. T. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010), pp. 29-64.  
∗以上の日本語訳のほか、学術振興会への助成申請に関してご助力頂いた次の方々への謝辞をここで述べた。申
請書の「主な研究協力者」にご署名頂いた 10名の方々、および非署名者でご相談に乗って頂いた方々、クラー
ク先生の客員研究員としての招聘を受諾して頂いた首都大学東京社会科学研究科およびその事務担当者の方々。
Here in Japanese,I expressed my gratitude to my Japanese colleague who helped with the invitation of 
Prof.Clark by JSPS. 
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Feudal lords, neighbourhoods and cooperative 
organizations by trade in early modern Japan 
 
Takashi Kato 
 
Professor Clark’s lecture brings up a number of points in comparing the east and the west with regards to 
cities. Here I would like to limit my comments to the issue of conflict resolution, focusing on cooperative 
organizations in early-modern Japan known as stock societies, brotherhoods of merchants and craftsmen. 
At the end of the 16th century in Japan, processes established by the central authority (the unified 
government) prohibited parties involved in intra-regional or inter-regional disputes (including samurai, 
farmers, and townspeople) from settling their own differences by force (determining their own fate). They 
were instead to raise charges against each other in the central authority’s (including the regional authority 
of feudal lords) courts and let those judgments decide their matters. As the holders of public authority, 
feudal lords (in early-modern times these were stratified into shogunate and daimyo lords) intended fair 
and impartial judgements, that is to say, bringing about commonality and public benefit, to be one of the 
functions the courts would serve. Feudal lords in early-modern times didn’t gain unilateral control with 
massive shows of force. It was because they pledged commonality and public benefit that the people 
accepted their rule. At the same time, to consummate their control feudal lords delegated some authority to 
neighbourhoods (villages, “chos”) and cooperative organizations bound by  trade (stock societies, 
companies), but this also served to safeguard independence and autonomy within those organizations. It is 
the confluence of these that formed early-modern society in Japan. Further, in exchange for allowing 
monopoly rights to stock societies of merchants and craftsmen, feudal lords required the payment of 
monetary offerings (similar to trade taxes). 
In stock societies, members were elected in turns to board positions, where they handled union 
work. Members held meetings where they deliberated to come up with their stock society bylaws. These 
bylaws called for eliminating sales and purchasing competition between members, stabilizing supply levels, 
maintaining quality, making prices fair, making profit margins more even, and eliminating crooked 
dealings. Those who violated these bylaws were subject to penalties such as fines, suspension or closure of 
business operations, or expulsion from the stock society; relative to the severity of the violation. However, 
if bylaw violations by or between members could not be settled within the stock societies, they would be 
brought before the feudal lord’s court. Moreover, legal action would be taken by the feudal lord’s court to 
cease business activities by those who were not members of stock societies, in order to preserve monopoly 
rights. There were also several instances of disputes between stock societies in Edo and Osaka, or between 
societies in cities with different lords, that the societies themselves couldn’t resolve. These would be 
brought before the shogunate court to be resolved. 
It is true that stock societies had a level of independence and autonomy, and that this was 
officially recognized by feudal lords. However, the large number of judicial records that remain from 
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dispute resolution cases handled in the feudal courts, including that of the shogunate, indicates there were 
quite a few disputes that could not be handled within the stock societies. These were thus left to the courts 
to decide. This can be said not only for stock societies which are cooperative organizations bound by trade, 
but also for cooperative organizations bound by geography such as villages and towns. In other words, we 
cannot consider the issue of dispute resolution in early-modern Japan without also considering the feudal 
courts. To further consider the issue of the control of the lords and the autonomy of the citizens, it may 
also be necessary to clarify the differences between what specifically was dealt with within cooperative 
organizations and what was brought before feudal courts. Research on this has not progressed very far. 
For civil matters in which the lord’s concepts of social order or public morality had been 
violated, it was normal for an arbitrator to step in and negotiate a settlement rather than have the court pass 
a judgement. This was as long as the violation didn’t do something such as, for example, infringe on the 
monopoly rights of the stock association recognized by the lord. 
I thus make my comments by bringing up the case of early-modern Japan, though I am not 
certain I have provided enough information to make a good comparison. Suffice to say that while there are 
similarities between Europe and Japan in the settling of disputes by guilds and stock societies, my 
impression is that there may be large differences in how the cities and feudal lords interact, the nature of 
judicial power, and other such things. 
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The function of urban community in medieval and 
early modern Japan 
 
Chika Takatani 
 
I will introduce about the variety of forms of association in medieval Capital Kyoto, and compare with 
urban neighborhood that took the most important role of administration in early modern era. Especially,Ｉ
consider what forms of association could take the responsibility for resolution of conflicts.  
The essence of urbanity is various people get together and pursuit his or her various merits, so 
resolution of the conflicts is very important in cities. 
 
Kyoto had been the Capital since 794, whose model was Chinese Capital. But since 10th century, Kyoto 
was enlarged by the structure of new small cities in the suburbs. The small cities are the junction of 
distribution and the base of royal families or important politicians. But we can’t examine the lifestyle of 
dwellers from historical records. The government ordered dwellers to take responsibilities for cleaning 
roads, security at night, and so on, but we can’t think the orders were effective. It is difficult to catch the 
real condition of dwellers.  
 
We can see more detail of conditions of Kyoto dwellers in Muromachi Era, from 14C to 16C. 
Each urban dweller took part in various networks and connections; patron-client, guilds, or neighborhood. 
Patron or owner of guilds are nobles. When troubles happened, dwellers call for their help for litigation of 
Muromachi Shogunate.  
But the end of Muromachi era, too many conflicts happened, the help of patron and owner 
didn’t work enough. For example, I’d like to introduce one conflict.  The merchants whose master was a 
relative of emperor insisted that they should exempted traffic taxation, but the master of traffic barrier 
insisted that all merchants were subject to taxation because he serve necessities of emperor.  At Last, the 
merchants insist to judge by hot-water ordeal. 
Such conflicts often happened at that time.  Each side insisted on his privilege from legendary 
ancient emperors, religious authority, and so on.  
 
So, urban dwellers relied on their communities of neighborhood mainly, because the other networks 
couldn’t work enough for resolution of the conflicts. In Japanese cities in early modern era, community of 
neighborhood was very important, but it hadn’t been so throughout history.  It was the result of urban 
dwellers’ decision at the end of Muromachi era. 
 
During the early modern era, the smallest units of government in Japanese cities were, neighborhoods. 
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The urban population had grown, so the number of communities of neighborhood had also 
grown and their hierarchy of communities formed. The famous Japanese historian, Dr. Asao Naohiro, has 
argued that each community of neighborhood judged their own membership and demand obeying rituals to 
new member in early modern era. So, each community had rituals to membership 
And according to legal history of early modern era, form Confucianism morality, people 
shouldn’t bring lawsuit to authority, because people shouldn’t bother authority by private conflicts. If 
authority accept private lawsuits, it is not people’s light, but authority’s favor. People must get 
community’s approval before bringing lawsuit to authority.  In fact, it was peculiar to Japan. Early modern 
China society also had Confucianism morality, but it was natural for the society that authority was willing 
to resolve conflicts.  
The role of neighborhood of early modern era was important, but we should pay attention to 
the epoch of the end of Muromachi and the policy of authority in early modern Japan. 
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Two Risks with the Historical Approach Based on the 
Ideal Type: 
from the viewpoint of German medieval urban 
history 
 
Masayuki Furukawa 
 
I want to introduce some difficulties for the European urban history research, if we are going to use an 
analysis concept, "ideal type", used in urban theory of Max Weber (1864-1920). There are two risks, if we 
will use the ideal type which is an important key concept of Weber’s sociology for organizing historical 
city phenomenon.  First, is the risk of understanding unique results from a particular REGION if it were as 
an objective average image. Weber's urban typology have adopted the framework hypothetically, and 
especially on the subjectivity of Weber himself, from the city of southern Germany and north-middle Italy 
region.  In other words, we may become over simplifying the variety of historical urban phenomenon that 
the case for a not-be-generalized region. Secondly, by assuming that a model expected from urban 
phenomenon in a particular ERA to be the embryo of Western capitalism of modern times, the risk of 
underestimating the importance of temporal change. With the construction of the sovereign state system 
since the 16th century especially, many of these medieval city have lost the independence of the political 
autonomy. Using a model based on a particular era, would it be possible to discuss the history of the 
"European City" leading up to the modern from ancient times? I want to know the positive way about 
Weber's possibility today, therefore we organize for the two difficulties as a prerequisite. 
In Weber’s book The City (eng. 1958), he evaluates occidental cities also an economical as well as the 
independent political entity, even while conflict with the power of lords, the Holy Roman Emperor and the 
Pope. As a result, the city in late medieval age has made politically and economically its own development 
as the roots of modern Western capitalist society.  
So it should be noted is that many of the historical cities introduced in the book are distributed 
around southern Germany and north-middle Italy. Not only can their citizens the social layer engaged in 
economic activities, they govern themselves as those with aggressive behavior that maintain the 
community, and are positioned as presence that behave as political actors. That is to say, Weber’s view of 
the history of cities, while focusing on the uniqueness of the power relations of a particular region, is 
something that seeks the origin of citizenship from below that is not given by the state. He shows the 
direction that tries to argue the uniqueness of the entire Europe by relying on a particular space. On the 
other hand, Weber seeks the roots of occidental public society in medieval urban society, that is  to say, it 
is an era before the modern nation-state system appears. 
Would it be possible for us historian to use the methodology that can be derived from The 
City? Will we be able to use his methodology as the methodology for studies of the European city history? 
22 
 
That might be difficult. The urban phenomenon in the respective areas of Europe is too diverse. Even now, 
even in the Middle Ages. The relationship of the power of lords such as kings and nobles, and the cities 
appear in a variety of forms. On the other hand, in historical research, in terms of urban phenomenon of 
Germany and Italy also having a close relationship with the feudal rural world, it has been revealed that 
they have both created a rather similar environment from recently historical research. 
In addition, in The City, the modernization process is not discussed openly. This is also a 
weakness when incorporating the framework of the ideal type from Weber’s city theory as the approach 
for historical research. Along with the establishment of a sovereign state after Middle Age, the previous 
strength of the medieval city community, which is considered to have been politically as an independent 
entity, is weakened (even disappeared). It is not possible to extend the appearance of medieval urban 
society as it is to the world of the modern nation straightly. And the relationship between the city and the 
nation continued to change diverse throughout the Europe.  
Therefore, within the expansion of European city history that is heading towards modernization, 
historians must discuss IN WHAT WAY “things that are intended to be grasped through the ideal type” 
will be passed down. This challenge is the cause of difficulty that is face by those of us that have an 
interest in Weber’s city theory. 
 
Related Bibliography（参考文献）： 
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研究科地域文化研究専攻）』18、2013年、1-8頁 
犬飼裕一『マックス・ウェーバー 普遍史と歴史社会学』梓出版社、2009年  
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Macht die Stadtluft frei? 
 
Kinichi Ogura 
 
Das beruehmte Rechtsprichwort ueber die mittelalterliche Stadt “ die Stadtluft macht frei” 
(the air of town makes free) ist fuer ein Produkt der deutschen Romantik von Bruedern 
Grimm und anderen im 19.Jahrhundert gehalten. Im Mittelalter hiess z.B. der betreffende 
Artikel im Stadtrecht von Goslar  (1219) folgender: 
“Si quis vero extraneus civitatem iam dictam ad inhabitandum intraverit et in ea  
sic per annum et diem perstiterit, quod de servili conditione nunquam fuerit accusatus, 
convictus vel confessus,communi aliorum burgensium gaudeat libertate.” 
(Wenn ein Fremder in diese Stadt zum Wohnen hineinkaeme und hier fuer ein Jahr  
und einen Tag bliebe, daher ueber seine unfreie Zugehoerigkeit niemals angeklagt, 
bewiesen oder gestanden wuerde, freute er sich ueber die mit anderen Buergern 
gemeinsame Freiheit.) [1] 
In Frankfurt am Main, meinem Forschungsgegenstand, habe ich solchen Artikel nicht 
gefunden, aber kann sagen, dass diese Reichsstadt sich dasselbe Prinzip durchzusetzen 
bemuehte und die Aufrechterhalten der “libertates et pax “ (Freiheiten und Frieden ) die 
Grundaufgaben der Buergergemeinde war[2]. 
 
Die Definition Max Webers ueber die Stadt im Okzident als ein Idealtypus (Idealtype) ist 
fuer mich immer noch der lehrreiche und nutzbare Begriffsapparat. Wir muessen aber 
bemerken, dass seine Schrift “Die Stadt “ ein unvollendeter Nachlass ist und seine Ansicht 
ueber die moderne Stadt leider ausser folgendem Hinweis fehlt： 
 “….Und doch ist weder der moderne Kapitalismus noch der modene Staat auf dem 
Boden der antiken Staedte gewachsen, waehrend die mittelalterliche Stadtentwicklung  
fuer beide zwar keineswegs die allein ausschlaggebende Vorstufe und gar nicht ihr 
Traeger war, aber als sein hoechst entscheidender Faktor ihrer Entstehung allerdings 
nicht wegzudenken ist.” [3]  
  
 Weber untersuchte im Okzident die universalgeschichtlichen Kulturerscheinungen, 
richtete seinen Augenmerk auf die “Entzauberung”(Free from the spell) und 
die”Rationalisierung” (Rationalisation) und schrieb mehrere Schriften, wie “Die 
protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus”, “Die Soziologie der Herrschaft”, “Die 
Rechtssoziologie”, “Die Religionssoziologie” u.s.w.  Sogar in seinem Lebensabend nahm er die 
Problematik des modernen Kapitalismus und der rationale Bureaukratie wahr und dachte 
ueber das Paradox der Rationalisierung tief nach[4]. Ich bedauere deshalb sehr, dass wir 
sein Geschichtsbild ueber die moderne Stadt nicht mehr erfassen koennen. Wuerden Sie mir 
etwas dazu sagen? 
 
Im vorigem Jahr 2014, dem 150.Geburtsjahr Max Webers, fanden verschiedene 
Gedenkveranastaltungen in Europa und Japan statt.  Deshalb danke ich Ihnen, Prof.Clark, 
sehr fuer Ihren heutigen Vortrag in der globalisierten Weltstadt Tokyo ,  
in dem Sie die universale Stadtentwickelung von den Alten Zeiten bis zur Gegenwart 
ueberblickt und auf seinem  Idealtypus die neuen anregenden Gedanken ueber die 
Stadtautonomie im Vergleich vom Westen und Osten geaeussert haben.  
Ich habe  mich vor allem fuer die Loesung der Streiten und Konflikten und Ihre Hinweise, 
dass trotz der Gerichtsverfassung  eher das Schiedverfahren (mit der gerichtlichen 
Schiedsentscheidung oder ohne dies) in beiden Weltteilen verbreitet war. Das 
Prozessverfahren dauerte lange und kostete viel und spaltete die Betreffenden und ihre 
Lokalgemeinschaft, aber die Ausgleichung stellte sie zusammen. Ich habe mich an den 
goldenen Spruch “pactum legem vincit et amor judicum” (Die Uebereinkunft siegt das 
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Gesetz, die Ausgleichung das Urteil ; aus dem Gesetzbuch Heinrichs I.von England im 
12.Jahrhundert) erinnert[5].  
Wenn es so waere, stelle ich Ihnen zwei Fragen :  (1) welcher Konflikt das Beispiel 
Freiburg in Deutschland konkreter war, und (2) warum in der Fruehneuzeit Englands die 
Klubs und die Assoziationen die Ausgleichungen  eifrig versuchten und den Unterschied zu 
Deutschland und Frankreich machten. Diese Fragen, glaube ich, weiterhin den 
interessanten Bezug mit den Diskussionen um die “Kommunikative Oeffentlichkeit 
(communicative public sphere) zu nehmen, die Juergen Habermas in neuerer Zeit 
eroerterte[6].  
 
  Zum historischen Vergleich zwischen den Staedten in Westen und Osten duerfte ich  
noch einen japanischen Beispiel zur Debatte stellen und zwar dieTheorie Akira Hayamis von 
der “Arijigoku” (Ameisen-Hoelle) fuer Edo, also Tokyo in der Fruehneuzeit[7]. Unsere 
Metropolis war auch die grossen Stadtgraeber, wo die Bevoelkerungszuwaeche durch die 
Naturkatastrophen,  wie das Erdbeben, den Vulkanausbruch, das Hochwasser,  das 
Grossfeuer oder die Hungernot, die Epidemie, und sogar den Kindesmord und die  
Abtreibung  aus der Armut  untergedruckt  worden  waren. Und zum Schluss moechte ich 
als ein Histoiker, der von der heimatvertriebenen Fluechtlingen und Emigranten in der 
grobalisierten Welt der Gegenwart sehr beeindruckt und tief   beruehrt ist, aufrichtig  
fragen:  Macht die Stadtluft frei ? 
Anmerkungen  
[1] Friedrich Keutgen, Urkunden zur staedtischen Verfassungsgeschichite, Berlin 1889 
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[2] Kinichi Ogura, Doitsu Chuuseitosi no Jiyuu to Heiwa―Frankfurt no Rekisi kara   
 ( Die Freiheiten und Frieden in der deutschen Stadt im Mittelalter―Zur Geschichte  
  Frankfurts）, Tokyo (Keiso Shobou)  2007. 
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Overview of  
Professor Peter Clark’s Lecture and Discussions 
       
Minoru Yasumoto 
 
 
One of the crucial points Professor Clark has addressed in the lecture is how to make a comparative study 
of urban communities in historical perspective. It appears that urban entities should be investigated in a 
wide range of international contexts. For comparative study, urban history could be one of the most 
appropriate and promising research fields, as urban communities today as well as in historical perspective 
demonstrate unusual and individualistic characteristics. Professor Clark’s lecture has thrown down a 
challenge to us of how we should proceed with the work on comparative urban history.  
First of all, we should consider what is to be the aim of comparison. Is it only for seeking to explain 
differences and idiosyncrasies in terms of the patterns of growth, changing economic and social structure 
or the institutions overtime and between regions or countries? Or is it for finding out the common features 
or similarities between them? If the former is to be our ultimate aim, comparative urban study contributes 
to our understanding of the peculiarities of a certain urban communities. The latter would aim at 
comprehending what are the essential characteristics of urbanity over time and across regions. As well as 
one-way comparison to search representativeness and deviations and two-way, reciprocal comparison, we 
will have to scrutinize connections and interactions between the urban communities in East and West, as K. 
Pomeranz has pointed out in his comparative analysis of East and West in The Great Divergence, Europe, 
China, and the Making of the Modern World Economy, Princeton, 2000, pp.3-27). 
It would seem to be easier for us to make any comparative urban study in medieval and early modern 
periods. Yet it should be difficult to do it in modern and contemporary framework, as we have an 
increasing ‘connectivity’ in time which would make it difficult for us to distinguish the indigenous features 
from the inter-continental or inter-regional transference of cultural, political and economic systems (See P. 
Clark, Introduction in The Oxford Handbook of Cities in World History, Oxford, 2013, p.5). 
However there should be much prospect of comparative approaches, which we will have to 
develop. For example, a framework of analysis is possible in which we could discuss about the influences 
of religious creeds on various aspects of town life. Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism or 
Confucianism should have exerted respective effects not only on the urban topography, layout or landscape, 
but also on the urban governance, communal identities or even consumption patterns. When it comes to 
Christianity since the middle ages, common good ideals prevailing among the European town inhabitants 
should have made the town governance and representativeness work better.   
Another important point we have been discussing in the lecture is how the urban communities in East and 
West resolved the conflicts, which Dr. Kato and Dr. Takatani have addressed. Was there any difference in 
conflict resolution between Europe, Asia, Middle-East and other non-European cities? How to carry out 
conflict resolution must be a crucial issue when we consider the autonomy, political and juridical 
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independence of urban communities. The impression based on the discussions is that there wouldn’t have 
been any basic difference in trouble-shooting between historical Western and Eastern urban communities. 
They could have managed to resolve the conflicts or disputes among the town dwellers mostly by 
arbitration or mediation in the form of procedures by the guilds (Nakama or Kumiai in early modern 
Japan), neighbourhood, brotherhood organizations, native place societies especially in China and so on 
rather than in the formal litigation at courts. Professor Clark has analyzed in detail why arbitration or 
mediation would have been preferred to litigation in both East and West (Professor Clark’s lecture paper, 
pp.7-9). 
In this regard, we will have to be more specific about what kind of conflicts or troubles could 
or could not have been resolved by arbitration or mediation among the members of urban organizations 
and associations. It is interesting to note that in Tokugawa Japan even the procedures in the local 
seigniorial courts which dealt with the conflicts beyond the control of communal organizations, were not 
usually practiced in the form of judgements given, but in the form of reconciliation by the arbitrators 
appointed by the lords, as Dr. Kato has suggested. 
Last but not least, we have Max Weber’s well-known model on the difference in terms of civic autonomy 
between East and West, about which Professor Ogura and Mr. Furukawa have raised questions. Besides 
Weber’s emphasis on the difference in municipal autonomy between Europe and non-European areas, 
there remain other important problems for us to consider, for example, whether or not modernization, rise 
of capitalism, rationalization or freedom from the spell, originated from civic cultures, and whether or not 
his ideal-type concept of ‘true urban communities’ was developed mainly based on the examples of south 
German and north Italian cities. These are yet unsolved important subjects that we will have to tackle (See 
C. R. Friedrichs, ‘What Made the Eurasian City Work? Urban Political Cultures in Early Modern Europe 
and Asia’ in City Limits, Perspectives on the Historical European City, ed. by G. Clark, J. Owen, and G.T. 
Smith, Montreal & Kingston, 2010, pp.33-34).  
Medieval and early-modern towns in Western Europe tend to have enjoyed stronger municipal 
autonomy in terms of governance, communal identities, action, representativeness or economic activities 
than those in Asia, Middle East, and other non-European countries. Admittedly in Japan we have an 
interesting example of urban society of Sakai. The town is said to have been more independent and freer 
from outside political interferences in which the wealthy merchant class provided leadership in various 
aspects of urban life (See James McClain, ‘Japan’s Pre-Modern Urbanism’ in The Oxford Handbook of 
Cities in World History, Oxford, 2013, p.331). 
However it seems to have been rather an exceptional case in that the municipal autonomy in 
most other towns in Japan would have been weaker as compared with some of the European counterparts. 
So that the Max Weber’s thesis does not seem to be outdated or discredited. Nevertheless we will have to 
make a comparative study not only in terms of civic political independence or autonomy but also in terms 
of power structures of state or central governments themselves between the Occidental and Oriental worlds. 
The historical trajectory of the state system or the central power structures must have been different in East 
and West (See P. Clark, European Cities and Towns 400-2000, Oxford, 2009, p.362). 
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